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 Watergate: An Anatomy Of A Constitutional Crisis  
 Introduction 
 On August 9, 1974 Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States of 
America. Nixon's resignation came after the Supreme Court ruled he could not claim executive 
privilege to withhold private recordings of Oval Office conversations he had made during his 
presidency. These tapes revealed that Nixon and his advisors had conspired to suppress evidence 
and information regarding the Watergate break-ins. The attempts on the part of the executive 
branch to use executive privilege to shield itself from releasing criminally damning evidence was 
a constitutional crisis, although some scholars debate this. Constitutional crises occur when 
constitutional actors become embroiled in conflict that escalates to the point that the government 
is incapable of functioning as intended, under the Constitution. A comparison of  other 
constitutional crises or near crises, such as Ohio's public defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling 
in M'Culloch v Maryland(1819), President James Buchanan's adherence to his constitutional 
obligations which prevented him from keeping South Carolina from seceding, and the conflicting 
state interpretations versus federal interpretations of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v 
Board of Education (1954,1955), with those of Nixon's Watergate will demonstrate why Nixon's 
Watergate was also a constitutional crisis. Nixon's actions during the Watergate cover-up, 
particularly his abuse of executive power, not only created political and criminal crises, but 
forced a constitutional one as well. 
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 Constitutional Crises 
 Constitutional crises, as the name indicates, are disputes between constitutional actors 
(whether it be an entire state, government branch, or an individual official) that reach a level 
where the government and/or individual branches cannot function as intended as a result of the 
dispute. Two legal scholars, Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin detail the three subcategories of 
constitutional crises that can occur. The first subcategory is a public defiance crisis, which occurs 
when, "political leaders publicly claim the right to suspend features of the Constitution in order 
to preserve the overall social order and to meet the exigencies of the moment."1 This type of 
crisis occurred in the case of M'Culloch v Maryland (1819), when the state of Ohio sent armed 
state representatives into a federal bank to forcibly collect state taxes, in public defiance of the 
Supreme Court ruling. The second type of crisis, a strict adherence crisis, occurs when, "all 
relevant actors comply with their widely accepted constitutional duties and roles, but following 
the accepted understandings of the Constitution fails to resolve an existing political crisis or 
leads to disaster."2 The most noted example of this type of crisis is President Buchanan's refusal 
to act outside of  his narrowly defined Constitutional obligations to prevent South Carolina from 
seceding from the Union, resulting in Civil War. The third, and most common type of 
constitutional crisis, an interpretation crisis, occurs when "the relevant actors all proclaim their 
constitutional fidelity; they simply disagree about what the Constitution requires and about who 
holds the appropriate degree of power."3 In the case of Brown v. Board of Education (1955), 
several southern states resisted the ruling that segregation was unconstitutional. These states felt 
that the Supreme Court had overstepped its powers to regulate states' right to decide how to run 
its schools (i.e. segregate them). Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus felt so strongly about this that 
he deployed the national guard of his state to prevent the integration of Central High School in 
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Little Rock, Arkansas. Each of these cases exemplify the type of category it falls within, and by 
using the criteria established by each, one can examine other crises to determine if they too reach 
the threshold of a constitutional crisis. 
 
Public Defiance Crisis 
 When the state of Ohio refused to comply with the ruling issued in M'Culloch v 
Maryland (1819), it created a public defiance constitutional crisis. In M'Culloch v Maryland 
(1819), the Supreme Court had ruled that: 
 The state within which a branch of the United States Bank may be established cannot 
constitutionally tax it, nor pass any law to control or impede its operations, or the 
operations of the parent bank.4  
 
The Court asserted that States cannot tax, pass laws to tax, or prevent the running of the federally 
established banks. Chief Justice John Marshall based his decision on the "implied powers" 
doctrine.5 The implied powers doctrine, when applied in this case, stated that while the 
Constitution did not specifically say that Congress could establish a federal bank such a power 
was implied by other powers it had been granted. Chief Justice Marshall's application of implied 
powers is considered one, if not the most, important rulings of his career. However, legal 
scholars Harold J. Plous and Gordon E. Baker have argued that while his use of implied powers 
was valid he chose the wrong case in which to apply it.  
 The core dispute that states, like Maryland and Ohio, had with the M'Culloch ruling was 
over their rights to collect taxes from the federal banks located in their states. Plous and Baker 
argue that because the issue over the banks was so contested by the states, that it would have 
been better for  Marshall to have picked a case that was less controversial to legitimize the 
implied powers doctrine.6 While there is some validity to their argument, that a less controversial 
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case might have made it easier for Marshall to lay the groundwork for establishing the 
constitutionality of the implied powers doctrine, it was the very fact that the case was 
controversial that allowed Marshall's groundwork to be so solid that it remains constitutional 
doctrine to this day.  
 The contested nature of the M'Culloch case forced each side to develop arguments 
centered around the implied powers doctrine. Albert Beveridge, Marshall's biographer, had this 
to say about the lawyers who argued the case, "the counsel for both sides in M'Culloch vs. 
Maryland were the most eminent and distinguished in the Republic."7 These counselors included 
Daniel Webster and William Pickney, both of whom argued for the Bank. The skill of these men 
during oral arguments gave Chief Justice Marshall the foundational legal arguments he needed to 
write his opinion. As Professor Fairman is quoted as saying, in Plous and Baker's legal analysis 
of the M'Culloch case, "Marshall's opinion is very tightly integrated with the arguments of [the 
Bank's] counsel..."8 Marshall's decision to choose such a contested case resulted in the foremost 
legal minds of the time assembling to argue the legal points of implied powers. It is because 
these minds were able to formulate such sound legal arguments, from which Marshall drafted his 
opinion, that the constitutionality of the implied powers doctrine has remained intact.  
 Even though the Supreme Court ruled that the establishment of federal banks was 
constitutional and that state right to tax them was not, Ohio State Auditor Ralph Osborn still 
disagreed. Osborn opposed the ruling that Congress could create a federal bank, and most 
importantly, he felt Ohio could collect taxes on the federal bank in Ohio.9 Even after an 
injunction was issued to prevent Osborn and his agents from collecting taxes from the Bank of 
Chilicothe, Ohio, Osborn sent  J.L Harper into the bank. Harper used force to collect the disputed 
taxes.10It is this public defiance against, not only the Supreme Court ruling in M'Culloch v 
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Maryland(1819), but also the state's defiance of the issued federal injunction, that forced a 
constitutional crisis. Congress was unable to properly run the federal bank in Chilicothe, Ohio 
because state officials publicly refused to follow both the legislative and judicial branches. 
Ohio's public defiance forced a second Supreme Court ruling in Osborn v Bank of U.S. (1824) 
which stated that "A State cannot tax the Bank of The United States" it further added that if any 
agents of the state attempted to collect taxes against the Bank of the United States they could be 
"restrained by injunction from the Circuit Court."11 This ruling was nearly the same as the 
previous ruling in M'Culloch, but was required in order to demonstrate to Ohio that neither 
Congress nor the Supreme Court would allow Ohio to act against the ruling. 
 While the Supreme Court has the power to determine the constitutionality of the other 
branch's actions, it does not have the power to enforce these determinations. That power rests 
with the legislative branch. When Ohio defied the Supreme Court ruling, Congress held the 
power to compel Ohio to follow the ruling. The problem was, however, that while Ohio was 
defying the Supreme Court ruling, its real issue was with Congress' initial action of creating a 
federal bank and disallowing the taxation of these banks. Ohio did not agree with either branch 
of government and refused to abide by both. While Ohio's representatives never stood up and 
literally said, "We will not follow what you have ruled" their actions in forcibly collecting the 
taxes from the Chilicothe bank conveyed that message clearly. Ohio's action after the Supreme 
Court ruling in  M'Culloch created a public defiance constitutional crisis. The  Supreme Court 
resolved the crisis with the second ruling in Osborn which compelled Ohio to comply with both 
rulings, and it did so. 
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Strict Adherence Crisis 
 The second category of crises is a strict adherence constitutional crisis, which occurs 
when constitutional actors adhere to the Constitution, however, even in doing so, the conflict 
cannot be resolved, forcing a constitutional crisis. Such a crisis emerged with South Carolina's 
secession from the Union. Initially, when South Carolina threatened secession from the Union, 
President James Buchanan knew he had to prevent any secession. He was aware that if South 
Carolina successfully left the Union it would have a domino effect taking other states with her. 
On December 20th, South Carolina adopted its 1860 Succession Ordinance. President Buchanan 
found himself in a position of figuring out how to keep South Carolina in the Union without 
starting a war.12 He was unsure if he had the constitutional powers to do this. Buchanan wrote to 
Attorney General Black to answer questions as to the "extent of [his] official powers."13 
Historian Ticknor G. Curtis maintains that the answers Black gave Buchanan about his powers 
were sound. The crux of Attorney General Black's advice can be summed up with this passage 
included in his response to Buchanan, "He [the President] cannot accomplish a legal purpose by 
illegal means, or break the laws himself to prevent them from being violated by others."14 It is on 
this point that Curtis takes issue with Buchanan's critics who have harshly judged him for the 
actions he took based on Black's advice. Curtis remarks that critics have failed to consider that 
President Buchanan had "no constitutional power to declare, no authority to prosecute, and no 
right to institute a war against a State."15 If Buchanan were to prevent South Carolina's secession 
he would have had to compel them by force which, as Curtis pointed out, he had no 
constitutional power to do. In essence, the Constitution of the United States failed to provide 
President Buchanan with the powers to prevent state secession. It is this failure of the 
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Constitution that allowed the session of several Southern states which led to the Civil War, the 
greatest constitutional crisis the United States has ever faced.  
 If the Constitution did not provide explicit means for Buchanan to prevent the South 
Carolinian secession why then did he not use his broader executive power? Article II, Section I, 
Clause I of the United States Constitution states, "The executive power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States."16 The Constitution does not enumerate what exactly that power 
entails, and as President Woodrow Wilson aptly remarked that with executive power a president 
“has the right, in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can...only his capacity will set the 
limit.”17 Buchanan was deeply troubled by the consequences of his actions were he to prevent 
South Carolina's secession by means not explicitly stated in the Constitution. As Buchanan saw 
it, the problem with using his executive privilege centered around the oath he took to execute the 
laws of the Constitution. However, once South Carolina seceded he believed it had removed 
itself from the system that enacted and enforced those constitutional laws.18 Buchanan could not 
force South Carolina to remain in the Union without deploying armed soldiers. The predicament 
Buchanan found himself in is explained by  his biographer Philip Shriver Klein, "Neither 
secession nor coercion were comprehended in the federal constitution."19 According to the 
Constitution, Buchanan could no more force South Carolina to stay in the Union than South 
Carolina was allowed to leave. There were absolutely no constitutional provisions to deal with 
state secession from the Union. All branches of the government agreed that Buchanan was 
adhering to his constitutional obligations. Even still this did not resolve the matter of South 
Carolina seceding, for which Buchanan is still harshly judged. Buchanan's decision to stay within 
the confines of his constitutional obligations made him unable to prevent the conflict over state 
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secession from escalating to the Civil War. The North's victory ended the Civil War and this 
ended the constitutional crisis.  
 While Curtis clearly explains the difficulties President Buchanan faced with South 
Carolina's secession, the criticisms of how Buchanan handle the situation are still entirely valid. 
While Buchanan did not act outside his constitutional obligations, he had an even greater 
obligation to keep the Union intact. If states were able to secede the Constitution would have no 
real power. This is mostly why there are no provisions in it to deal with state secession. The 
power of the Constitution rests on those acting under it, including all three branches of the 
government, to respect the rulings, laws, and its amendments. South Carolina's actions simply 
could not be allowed if the authority of the Constitution, and by extension all the states, was to 
remain intact. While Buchanan is correct in that the Constitution did not allow him any explicit 
powers to prevent secession, he seemed more at ease with continuing to believe that was his 
most important obligation. Curtis details all the lengths that Buchannan went to have his actual 
Constitutional powers explained and defined to him.20 What Curtis accurately describes, 
intentional or not, is a scared man not wanting to be known as the president who caused a civil 
war. Unfortunately for Buchanan not only is he known as the president who allowed South 
Carolina to secede but he is known for doing so because of inaction on his part. One can 
certainly appreciate the difficult situation Buchanan was in, but he had an absolute and primary 
obligation to preserve the Union. This obligation was the one he should have given precedence in 
his discussions over South Carolina's secession. Instead of it being his top priority, he concerned 
himself more with adhering to the Constitution without realizing that in not forcing South 
Carolina to remain in the Union he was failing the Constitution in the most critical way possible.  
 
9 
 
Interpretation  Crisis 
 The final type of constitutional crisis, an interpretation crisis, occurs when constitutional 
actors disagree about interpretation regarding powers granted by the Constitution. These 
disagreements result in each side refusing to accept the other's interpretation. The crisis resolves 
when one side's interpretation prevails as the newly accepted constitutional "conventional 
wisdom" on the disputed issue.21 Legal scholars Levinson and Balkin claim that in interpretation 
crises, "each side may accuse the other of fomenting a [public defiance] crisis, while 
simultaneously claiming impeccable legal pedigree for its own actions."22 In interpretation crises 
each side believes its position to be supported by the Constitution. Levinson and Balkin 
emphasize the intertwining of public defiance crises with interpretation crises. This often occurs 
because disputes over constitutional powers are often played out in the public eye. Such a public 
battle over constitutional powers can be seen in the disputes that arose over the issue of 
integration in public schools. 
 The 1954 Supreme Court ruling Brown v. Board of Education (1954) declared the 
practice of "separate but equal" segregation in schools unconstitutional.23 With public school 
segregation now unconstitutional, a battle arose over the implementation of desegregation in 
public school systems. Many southern states ardently opposed integration and felt that the federal 
government had overstepped its powers. The challenge to the Supreme Court decision focused 
on Chief Justice Marshall's footnote in Brown that mentioned psychologists' findings that black 
children were harmed mentally by segregation. The footnote, they claimed, proved that this was 
a ruling based on sociology not legal precedent.24 As acts of resistance, southern states delayed 
or completely prevented  the integration of public schools from occurring. In the 1954 Brown 
ruling it did not address the timeframe in which states had to comply with the order to 
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desegregate public schools. The 1955 Brown ruling addressed this issue and stated schools had to 
be desegregated "with all deliberate speed."25 The inclusion of phrase, "with all deliberate speed" 
resulted in many Southern states attempting to find ways to "legally" circumvent the ruling. 
 In September of 1957 the Little Rock, Arkansas school board decided to integrate Central 
High School by allowing nine black students to attend the high school. On the evening of 
September 2, 1957, the night before Central High School was set to be integrated, Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus deployed the National Guard and state police at Central High School.26 
Faubus gave a speech that evening in which he explained that his deployment of the National 
Guard was not a sign of support nor defiance of the attempt to integrate the high school. But, he 
added, in order for the troops to be able to do their job of maintaining public safety, the school 
would need to continue its policy of segregation.27 His interpretation of his duty to protect the 
general public from violence led him to deploy the troops. Faubus was quoted on September 3, 
1957 as stating the troops "will not act as segregationists or integrationists," but on September 4, 
1957 Faubus changed his orders to the National Guard.28 He now explicitly ordered the state 
militia "prohibit the black children from entering Central High School."29 His decision, and 
justification, that in order for his troops to prevent violence segregation needed to continue, 
forced a constitutional crisis. The Arkansas Governor had declared that his constitutional power 
to maintain order overrode the Supreme Court's ruling to integrate public schools. By deploying 
troops to enforce law and order he had not only publicly defied the Supreme Court's order to 
integrate, but he also challenged the Court's interpretation of its power to force state compliance. 
In response to Faubus's deployment of troops, President Eisenhower sent in federal troops to 
escort the students to school and to uphold Brown. While the  conflict over integration in 
Arkansas continued, in the end Faubus lost his battle with the Court and schools in Arkansas 
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started to integrate. After it became clear to states still practicing segregation, that the federal 
government was not going to allow resistance to desegregation, states began the process of 
integrating their schools. 
Conflict Not Crisis 
 Not all conflicts over constitutional interpretation result in crisis. Further examination of 
Southern resistance to the Brown ruling demonstrates how some state's conflicts over 
interpretation resolved themselves before reaching a point of crisis. The actions of Georgia 
Governor S. Marvin Griffin and the state legislature could certainly have led to a constitutional 
crises, if the crisis did not resolve on its own. Governor Griffin said that the schools of Georgia 
would not be desegregated, "come hell or high water."30 In order to keep practicing segregation, 
the Georgia legislature passed state laws that defied the Supreme Court's ruling. In February 
1956, six bills supporting practices of segregation were signed into law by Governor Griffin.31 
Most of the laws that were passed dealt with the operation of private schools because the 
Supreme Court's ruling on integration only applied to public schools.32 Georgia's state legislature 
and governor saw no reason that private schools should be regulated under Brown v. Board 
(1954,1955). Thus to them, their interpretation of this constitutional ruling was valid. Their 
overall plan was that all the public schools in Georgia would be converted to private schools. 
The bill allowing this plan to go forward  stated that if integration was allowed to proceed  public 
schools would close.33 In this, Georgia lawmakers thought they had found a legal way to resist 
the Brown ruling. 
 While Georgia lawmakers felt they were legally circumventing the Supreme Court ruling, 
others disagreed and began to challenge their attempt to continue practicing segregation. The 
NAACP challenged Georgia lawmakers' threat to close public schools to prevent integration in 
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U.S District Court M.D. Georgia case Holmes v. Danner (1960)34 (which was latter upheld in the 
U.S Supreme Court case Danner v. Holmes (1961) ).35 This case challenged the University of 
Georgia (UGA) regarding its policy of segregation by demonstrating that UGA had denied two 
black students admission solely based on their race. Holmes reaffirmed Brown, that segregation 
was unconstitutional, and that UGA had to allow the two plaintiffs to enter the school.36 If 
Georgia was to continue its "private school plan," UGA would also have to be privatized.37 
While many Georgia residents supported the fight against integration, the idea of closing down 
the University of Georgia in order to privatize it did not sit well with them. This was because 
UGA was the state's flagship school and many Georgians were extremely proud of it. To close it 
was unthinkable. In February 1961, the battle over integration  in Georgia came to an end when 
two black students were allowed to enroll in UGA in accordance with the Holmes decision.38 
While Georgia's attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court certainly could have lead to a 
constitutional crisis, the legislature's unwillingness to close down UGA resolved the 
constitutional conflict before it reached a point of crisis.  
Watergate: A Constitutional Crisis 
 The constitutional crisis that erupted in 1974 over Watergate, centered primarily around 
President Nixon's abuse and interpretation of executive privilege. He repeatedly claimed that 
national security necessitated his invoking executive privilege to withhold the Watergate tapes. 
In declaring executive privilege and refusing to turn over the tapes, even for in camera review, 
Nixon created both a public defiance and an interpretation crisis. In the case of Environmental 
Protection Agency v Mink (1973), only a year before Watergate, is the start of serious conflict 
over constitutional powers  between Nixon's executive office and both the legislative and judicial 
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branches. The conflict of interpretation was over whether Nixon could claim executive privilege 
to withhold documents (tape transcripts) from other branches.  
 The case of Environmental Protection Agency v Mink (1973) resulted from a dispute over 
Nixon's unwillingness to release nine documents to Congress. In July 1971, Congress became 
aware that President Nixon had received differing recommendations in regard to the underground 
nuclear testing that was to be conducted in the fall of that year. Congresswomen Patsy Mink, 
asked Nixon  for the "immediate release of recommendations and report by the inter-
departmental committee..."39 Nixon denied Mink's request, resulting in Mink and thirty-two other 
members of Congress filing a request for the documents under the Freedom of Information Act 
of 1966.40 The Supreme Court found that because both Congress and the Executive branch 
agreed that the documents were, "highly sensitive matter that is vital to our national defense and 
foreign policy," the executive branch had "met their burden of demonstrating that the documents 
were entitled to protection under Exemption 1."41 Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information 
Act states that the executive branch could not be compelled to release documents that had been 
declared top secret by Executive order, to protect national security.42 While the Supreme Court 
did rule in favor of the executive branch, one section in the Mink opinion stands out in regard to 
the later events of Watergate: 
Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will be necessary and appropriate. But it 
need not be automatic...the burden is, of course, on the agency resisting disclosure, and if 
it fails to meet its burden without in camera inspection, the District Court may order such 
inspection... In short, in camera inspection of all documents is not a necessary or 
inevitable tool in every case.43 
 Even though Nixon's success at withholding the documents regarding underground 
atomic testing from Congress was justified by the Court, his use of the same argument for the 
Watergate tapes is was not as viable. Nixon claimed that this same top secret status should  apply 
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to the Watergate tapes. He claimed that what was discussed in the Oval Office similarly and 
implicitly, always dealt with issues of national security.44 Congress and the public strongly 
disagreed with that claim. The relevance of the proceeding passage of the Mink opinion cannot 
be understated due to the battle that arose over the release of the Watergate tapes.  
 The political arena in Washington D.C was rocked to the core when on July 16, 1973, a 
former White House secretary, Alexander Butterfield testified during a Senate hearing 
investigating the initial Watergate break-in that President Nixon had taped Oval Office 
conversations.45 This revelation started a furious battle over the release of the tapes. Once it 
became known that tapes of Oval Office conversations existed, the Senate investigating 
committee and special prosecutor Archibald Cox immediately requested that Nixon turn over 
those tapes. Nixon refused.46 Nixon's refusal did not occur in a closed committee session nor in a 
private memo. He claimed that his executive privilege allowed him to refuse such a request in 
order to protect national security. This refusal was public knowledge with multiple newspapers 
running the story as a headline. The Washington Post's headline the day after he refused read, 
"President Refuses to Turn Over Tapes; Ervin Committee, Cox Issue Subpoenas."47After Cox 
issued the subpoenas Nixon ordered him fired and the special prosecutor's office shut down.48 It 
was these actions that later became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre."49 Public outrage at 
Nixon's clear attempts to hinder the investigation into his involvement in the Watergate scandal, 
forced him to reopen the special prosecutor's office on October 31, 1973.50 Leon Jaworski, the 
new special prosecutor, attempted to enforce Cox's subpoena to have Nixon release all of the 
Watergate tapes. Nixon again refused.51 Nixon also refused to allow the tapes to be reviewed in 
camera.52 With no other way to compel Nixon to turn over the tapes the case went before the 
Supreme Court in U.S. v Nixon (1974). The ruling in this case  affirmed the subpoena and 
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ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes to the special prosecutor's office.53 The unanimous opinion 
written by Chief Justice Warren Burger stated: 
neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level 
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege 
of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.54  
 
This statement addressed the very essence of the Watergate tapes controversy. Nixon attempted 
to withhold tapes by using a privilege he was constitutionally granted and which he had been 
allowed to claim in the Mink case. But as Burger pointed out and the Mink case established, such 
a privilege cannot be invoked all the time, particularly during a criminal investigation.  
 Legal scholars Levinson and Balkin have argued that Nixon's actions did not create a 
public defiance crisis because he himself never publicly stated that he would defy the Supreme 
Court nor did he disobey the final ruling in U.S. v Nixon. Yet, they do argue that Ohio's forcible 
collection of taxes was a public defiance crisis in that its actions constituted the public defiance. 
Nixon's action can also be viewed similarly. Nixon did not fully comply with the Supreme 
Court's order to hand over all the tapes. In fact, he could not. Prior to the Supreme Court case, 
one tape, now known as Tape 342, had over 19 minutes erased.55 While it is uncertain who 
actually erased the tapes, at the time of the erasure they were in the possession of the executive 
office. Nixon's Secretary Rosemary Fields at one pointed claimed she had accidently erased them 
while transcribing the contents. After a staged reenactment it was proven that this could not have 
occurred as she said and that the tapes had clearly been altered deliberately.56 While Nixon may 
not have altered the tapes himself, someone in the executive office did. The tape erasure 
demonstrates that Nixon, and the executive office as a whole, never intended to comply with any 
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Supreme Court ruling. He ensured that his compliance would be on his own terms by altering the 
tapes. Because Nixon could not turn over all the tapes as a result of his own actions this qualifies 
him as publicly defying the Supreme Court. The deliberate erasure of a tape, combined with the 
public's awareness of the act, places Nixon's actions firmly in a public defiance crisis. 
 Nixon, on several occasions, publicly stated he would not release the tapes to the special 
prosecutor's office. When Special Prosecutor Cox refused to stop his pursuit of the tapes Nixon 
had the entire office shutdown. Again this was done with the public's knowledge. Nixon's claims 
that he was attempting to protect national security by exercising his executive privilege to 
withhold the tapes are completely disproven by examining the Watergate tapes themselves. In 
the Watergate tape of March 22, 1973 Nixon can be heard talking to his advisors John Dean, 
White House Counsel; John Ehrlichman, counsel and Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Affairs;  H.R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff; and John Mitchell, Attorney General of 
the United States, about the strategy of claiming executive privilege to avoid testifying and/or 
releasing documents. Ehrlichman starts out the conversation by stating, "Our brother Mitchell 
brought us some wisdom on executive privilege...".57 John Mitchell then explained that, as a 
strategy, executive privilege could be used to keep former and current White House employees  
from testifying before the Senate committee.58 Later in the conversation Nixon referred to the 
strategy as, "the executive privilege thing" and a few exchanges later stated it gave them 
flexibility "in order to get on with the cover-up plan."59 The tapes prove Nixon did not use his 
executive privilege in order to protect national security issues. He used his privilege instead to 
try to thwart an ongoing criminal investigation into his own behavior. 
 Nixon's interpretation of the way in which executive privilege could be used, or in his 
case abused, resulted in his battle with Congress and the Supreme Court. He firmly believed that 
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anything he discussed in the White House could be assigned the top secret label and he would 
then be safe from any branch of government compelling him to turn over the tapes. The Supreme 
Court's ruling in Mink most likely gave him a false belief that it would again support his claims 
of protecting national security. Nixon chose to disregard the aspect of the ruling that made it 
clear that such a claim could not be unilaterally applied. He was well aware of the limits of 
claiming executive privilege to withhold documents. However, he refused to accept the Supreme 
Court's ruling that there were, in fact, limits to his powers. His actions throughout Watergate 
demonstrate his belief in his unlimited power. Nixon was so convinced that his interpretation of 
his executive privilege was valid that he repeatedly defied Congress.  
 Both sides used the Mink ruling to support their argument regarding the release of the 
Watergate tapes. Nixon used the section of the ruling that allowed him to claim national security 
to refuse the release of the tapes. Congress used the section of the ruling that clearly said this 
claim could not be applied in every case of refusal.  It is clear that Nixon felt executive privilege 
granted the President extreme latitude in explaining actions taken by the executive office. 
Congress felt such latitude was tantamount to the President having absolute, unchecked power to 
do as he pleased. The battle over the release of the Watergate tapes forced all three branches of 
the government to focus solely on that issue. This monopolization of each branch's time to deal 
with a singular issue in effect rendered the government non-functional. This inability to function 
directly resulted from Nixon's intentional actions. Nixon, not only publicly refused to comply 
with legally justifiable orders from other branches of the government, he did so with the intent of 
causing them to be incapable of doing their job (i.e. investigating the Watergate break-in). Nixon 
took the actions he did using claims of executive privilege, but did this as a strategy to cover-up 
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criminal wrongdoing, not because he was intending to remain faithful to the Constitution or 
protect national security.  
 Once the Watergate tapes (or, what had not been erased) were turned over to Senate 
Investigating Committee, the American public fully understood, as did Congress, why Nixon had 
been trying to keep them secret. With proof that Nixon had conspired with his executive office 
officials to cover-up their criminal behavior, the Senate initiated impeachment proceeding 
against him. Before the proceedings could begin, Nixon resigned, still claiming that his actions 
were justified in protection of national security. The manner in which Nixon claimed executive 
privilege was simply an abuse of power. It is exactly this abuse of his power, and the fact he did 
it so publicly, that qualifies these elements of Watergate to be considered both a public defiance 
and interpretation constitutional crisis. Nixon's resignation ended the constitutional crisis that he 
had started when he refused to release the Watergate tapes. 
Conclusion 
 The founders of the Constitution of the United States drafted the document during a time 
of conflict. They had every expectation that conflicts would continue to arise in the governing of 
the newly established nation. In developing a Constitution the founders knew that if they wanted 
the document to have longevity it needed to be able to handle disputes. This understanding of a 
need for the document to malleable is why they included a provision to amend it. However, they 
could not prepare for all conflicts that might arise in the future. When South Carolina seceded 
from the Union unanticipated weaknesses of the Constitution became evident. The founders did 
not anticipate a time when any state would attempt leave the Union, and therefore had not 
included any remedies for such actions. The founders did include broader powers for each 
branch which attempted to give them some leeway when dealing with unanticipated conflict 
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and/or crisis. This need for leeway is exactly why Chief Justice Marshall defended the implied 
powers doctrine so strongly. He too understood why flexibility was vital in preserving not only 
the Constitution, but also the Union. 
 During Watergate, Nixon exploited the flexibility of the Constitution regarding executive 
power. He did this to conceal his own crimes during Watergate. Even though his abuse of power 
forced a constitutional crisis, the Constitution itself provided the remedies to deal with his 
actions. The founders included the ability to impeach a president because they realized, and 
worried, that one day a president might go beyond the scope of his or her power and would need 
to be removed. Had Nixon not resigned he certainly would have been impeached. It is also 
probable that had President Gerald Ford not pardoned Nixon he would have faced criminal 
charges for his actions. Even though Nixon resigned before being officially removed, it was the 
Constitutional provisions regarding impeachment that ultimately resolved the crisis. It is a 
fascinating conundrum that the document fails and succeeds simultaneously. In this case, the 
broadness of executive powers allowed Nixon enough room to abuse and misinterpret his power 
demonstrating a weakness/failure of the document. But, the allowance for removal of a President 
who abuses his power shows the success of the document. This dichotomy demonstrates the 
brilliance and skill that the founders possessed in creating the Constitution. Constitutional crises 
will continue to occur, hopefully not many, but it can also be said that when such crises do occur 
the document that failed to prevent the crises will surely resolve them in the end. 
                                                 
1 Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, "Constitutional Crises" in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 
157, No. 3 (Feb. 2009) 721. 
2 Levinson "Constitutional Crises"729. 
3 Levinson "Constitutional Crises"738. 
4 M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
5 Harold J. Plous and Gordon E. Baker, "McCulloch v Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case", Sanford Law 
Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Jul., 1957) 710. 
6Plous and Baker, "McCulloch v Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case" 719. 
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Plous and Baker, "McCulloch v Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case" 719. 
8 Plous and Baker, "McCulloch v Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case" 724. 
9 Osborn v Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
10 Osborn v Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
11 Osborn v Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
12 Ticknor G. Curtis, Life of James Buchanan: Fifteenth President Of The United State Vol. II, (Franklin Square: 
New York: Harper & Brothers: 1883) 318. 
13 Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, 319. 
14 Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, 320. 
15 Philip Shriver Klein, President James Buchanan: A Biography, (University Park, Penn: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press:1962). 
16 US Constitution. 
17Woodrow Wilson as quoted  in, "Article II: Executive Department", Authenticated U.S. Government Information 
GPO, 433. 
18 Klein, President James Buchanan,  362. 
19 Klein, President James Buchanan,  363. 
20 Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, 315-329. 
21 Levinson "Constitutional Crises"738. 
22 Levinson "Constitutional Crises" 738. 
23 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kan. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
24 Mark Tushnet, "Brown v Board of Education" in Annette Gordon-Reed, Race on Trial: Law and Justice in 
American History (New York: Oxford University Press:2002) 172. 
25 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kan. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
26 Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis That Shocked The Nation, (New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster Inc.: 2007) 123. 
27 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 123. 
28 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 127. 
29 Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son, 127. 
30 Thomas V. O'Brien. "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise: The Struggle To Implement Brown In Georgia, 1950-
1973," Daugherity, Brian J., and Bolton, Charles C., eds. With All Deliberate Speed : Implementing Brown v. Board 
of Education. (Fayetteville, AR,: University of Arkansas Press, 2008).  
31 O'Brien, "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise". 
32 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kan. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
33 O'Brien, "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise"96. 
34 Holmes v Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (1961). 
35 Danner v Holmes., 364 U.S. 939 (1961). 
36 Holmes v Danner(1961). 
37 O'Brien, "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise", 95. 
38 O'Brien, "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise",96. 
39 Environmental Protection Agency v Mink, 410 U.S 73 (1973). 
40 EPA v Mink (1973). 
41 EPA v Mink (1973). 
42 EPA v Mink (1973). 
43 EPA v Mink (1973). 
44 Chris Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power: From Drafting of the Constitution To The War On Terror, 
(Madison Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press: 2013)120. 
45 "The Watergate Files", Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum, Web. Accessed April 10, 2016. 
46 Chris Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power,120. 
47 Watergate 25, www.washingtonpost.com, Web. Accessed April 10, 2016.  
48 Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power, 120. 
49 "Battle for Tapes-Timeline", The Watergate Files, Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum, Web. Accessed April 10, 
2016. 
50Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power, 120. 
51 Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power, 120. 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
52 Mark J. Rozell, "Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, And Accountability, Second Edition Revised 
(University of Kansas Press: 2002)  61. 
53 U.S. v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
54 U.S. v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
55 U.S. v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
56 "Battle for Tapes- Overview", The Watergate Files, Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum, 
www.fordlibrarymusuem.gov. Accessed April 10, 2016. 
57 Nixon White House Tape March 22 Part 1, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. www.nixonlibrary.gov. 
Accessed April 10, 2016. 
58 Nixon White House Tape March 22 Part 1. 
59 Nixon White House Tape March 22 Part 1. 
 
 
22 
 
  
Primary Sources:  
 
 
U.S Constitution (1784) 
 
M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1954,1955). 
Holmes v Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (1961). 
Danner v Holmes., 364 U.S. 939 (1961). 
Nixon White House Tapes, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, www.nixonlibrary.gov 
(1972, 1973). 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
Department of Justice Documents, Nixon's Watergate Scandal, 1975. 
Watergate 25, www.washingtonpost.com, Web. 
Secondary Sources: 
"Article II: Executive Department", Authenticated U.S. Government Information GPO. 
Bestor, Arthur. "The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis." The American Historical 
 Review, Vol. 69, No. 2 , Jan., 1964, 327-352. 
 
Chamberlain, D. H. "Osborn v. the Bank of the United States." Harvard Law Review, Vol. 1, 
 No. 5 , Dec. 15, 1887,  223-225. 
 
Edelson, Chris. Emergency Presidential Power: From the Drafting of the Constitution to the  
 War on Terror, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin,  2013, 117-143. 
 
23 
 
Gordon-Reed, Annette. Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History. Oxford University 
 Press, New York, 2002, 160-176. 
 
Irons, Peter. A People's History of The Supreme Court :The Men And Women Whose Cases And 
 Decisions Have Shaped Our Constitution. Penguin Group, New York, 2006. 
 
Jacoway, Elizabeth. Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis That Shocked The Nation. New 
 York, NY, Simon & Schuster, Inc. 2007. 
 
Klein, Philip Shriver. President James Buchanan: A Biography. The Pennsylvania State 
 University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1962, 353-367. 
 
Levinson, Sanford and Balkin. Jack M., "Constitutional Crises." University of Pennsylvania Law 
 Review, Vol. 157, No. 3, Feb. 2009,  707-753. 
O'Brien, Thomas V. "Defiance, Protest, and Compromise: The Struggle To Implement Brown In 
 Georgia, 1950-1973." Daugherity, Brian J., and Bolton, Charles C., eds. With All 
 Deliberate Speed : Implementing Brown v. Board of Education. Fayetteville, AR,: 
 University of Arkansas Press, 2008.  
 
Plous, Harold J. and Baker, Gordon E. "McCulloch v. Maryland Right Principle, Wrong Case." Stanford 
 Law Review. Vol. 9, No. 4 (Jul., 1957), 710-730. 
Rozell, Mark J. Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability. 2nd 
 Revised Ed. University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 2002. 
 
Ticknor, Curtis E. Life of James Buchanan: Fifteenth President Of The United States Vol. II. 
 Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square, New York, 1883, 315-351. 
 
Walker, Samuel. Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor 
 Custodians. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, 281-316. 
 
"The Watergate Files", Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov. 
 Web. 
 
